16. FOREKNOWLEDGE.

This is most certain, that if there are any things that are so contingent that there is an equal possibility both of their being or not being, so that they may be or they may not be; God foreknows from all eternity that they may be, and also that they may not be. All will grant that we need no revelation to teach us this. And furthermore, if God knows all things that are to come to pass, he also foreknows whether those contingent things will come to pass or no, at the same time that they are contingent and that they may or may not come to pass.

But what a contradiction is this, to say that God knows a thing will come to pass, and yet at the same time knows that it is contingent whether it will or no! That is, he certainly knows it will come to pass, and yet certainly knows it may not come to pass. What a contradiction is it, to say that God certainly foreknew that Judas would betray his Master or Peter deny him, and yet certainly knew that it might be otherwise, that is, certainly knew that he might be deceived! I suppose it will be acknowledged by all, that for God certainly to know that a thing will be, and yet certainly to know that it may not be, is the same as certainly to know that he may be deceived. I suppose it will also be acknowledged, that certainly to know a thing, and also at the same time to know that we may be deceived in it, is the same thing as certainly to know it and certainly to know that we are uncertain of it, or that we do not certainly know it; and that that is the same thing as certainly to know it and not certainly to know it at the same time. Which we leave to be considered, whether it ben’t a contradiction.

Works of Jonathan Edwards, Volume 13, The “Miscellanies:” Entry Nos. a–z, aa–zz, 1–500, ed. Thomas A. Schafer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 208-209.

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